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Abstract 
Policy shocks affect the rent distribution in long-term contracts, which can lead to such contracts 
being renegotiated.  We seek an understanding of what aspects of contract design, in the face of a 
substantial policy shock, affect the propensity to renegotiate.  We test our hypotheses using data 
on U.S. coal contracts after the policy shock of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. This law 
altered the regulation of emissions of sulfur dioxide from coal-fired electric power plants, 
initiating a tradable permit system for a subset of coal-fired power plants which had previously 
been unregulated at the federal level. Contracts are divided into two categories, those that were 
renegotiated following the shock and those that were not and their characteristics are used to 
determine how they influence whether or not a contract was ultimately renegotiated.  The 
number of years until the contract expires, a larger allowable sulfur content upper bound for 
plants regulated immediately by the tradable permit scheme, and the minimum quantity are all 
associated with a contract being renegotiated. 
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Introduction 
New policy initiatives have the ability to substantially shift rents within an economy.  As 
a result, entities which previously made investments tied to the initial state of affairs (for 
example capital developments, or long-term purchasing contracts) will be affected by any 
proposed changes in regulatory policy.  To date, there is a lack of empirical evidence concerning 
how these stakeholders contractually respond to the imposition of a change in regulatory policy.  
This leaves policymakers without an objective evaluation of the impact of their proposals on 
stakeholders’ rents, compared to the claims put forward.  This paper attempts to address this void 
by investigating how long-term contracts for coal delivery in the electricity generation industry 
responded to passage of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA). 
The implementation of the 1990 CAAA increased the demand for low-sulfur coal, and 
greatly reduced the demand for high-sulfur coal.  The coal contracts then in existence allowed a 
range of coal quality to be delivered in satisfaction of the contract terms.  If a plant had allowed 
the mine a large degree of flexibility in the sulfur content of coal delivered, passage of the 1990 
CAAA would therefore induce the plant owner to attempt to renegotiate the contract, to avoid the 
possible delivery of high-sulfur coal.  
Contracts were flexible in other ways as well, such as through the pricing mechanism or 
the delivery mechanism of the coal.  Such flexibility was not uniform, however, and many 
contracts ended up having to be renegotiated.  Our ultimate empirical question is to seek an 
understanding of what factors in the initial contract design led to (or avoided) this renegotiation 
decision.  More broadly, within the contextual example of coal contracts, we seek an 
understanding of what aspects of contract design affect the propensity to renegotiate when a 
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policy shock (such as new Congressional legislation) occurs in the midst of a long-term 
contracting environment. 
 We ground our empirical model in the theory of long-term contracts as first postulated by 
Coase (1937).  In The Nature of the Firm Coase effectively argued that long-term contracts 
emerge in a world of transaction costs.  Later authors (Williamson 1985, Klein et al 1978, 
Goldberg 1976) operationalized these ideas by identifying important categories of transaction 
costs, including uncertainty and asset specificity.  How these transaction-cost based issues are 
dealt with in any given contract determines the degree of flexibility a contract essentially 
embodies.  Our hypothesis is that when an outside shock occurs in the midst of a contracting 
environment, the more flexible the initial terms of the contract, the less the probability of explicit 
contract renegotiation in response to the outside shock.   
In our empirical context, we measure the degree of flexibility embodied in a contract with 
certain contract characteristics, such as the price adjustment mechanism and the number of years 
until the contract expires.  Results generally match expectations.  Contracts with a more rigid 
price adjustment mechanism and more years till expiration are more likely to be renegotiated.  A 
higher allowable sulfur content upper bound also leads to a higher probability of renegotiation 
for plants that will be affected by the strictures of the 1990 CAAA sooner. 
From a policy perspective, this paper contributes to the literature in at least two ways. 
First, many governments have or are debating the adoption of greenhouse gas policy which will 
have a similar effect on the coal market as the 1990 CAAA.  This historical look back at the 
effect of the 1990 CAAA on long-term fuel contracts will help in looking forward to the future 
effects of carbon emissions legislation today.  Second, this research speaks to the question of 
whether the efficiency of the 1990 CAAA was restricted by long-term contracting in the coal 
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market.  Swinton (2004), Carlson et al (2000), and Sotkiewicz and Holt (2005) have all 
suggested that the full cost savings potential of the tradable permit system in the 1990 CAAA 
was not achieved because inflexible, long-term contracts inhibited adjustment to the new state of 
affairs.  This paper, the first in the literature to do so, provides empirical evidence somewhat 
disputing this claim. 
 
Background & Literature Review 
Coal for use in the U.S. electricity industry is primarily procured through long-term 
contract.  Spot markets account for only around 15% of total sales.  The average duration of 
contracts, however, has been declining from around 14 years in the early 1980s to an average of 
8 years in the 1990s (Lange and Bellas, 2007).  Contracts are generally between a mine, a coal-
fired power plant, and a transportation firm (often a railroad).  Joskow (1985) provides a detailed 
overview of contracts in the coal industry and notes that a mine and a power plant usually rely on 
long-term contracts that are incomplete but quite complex. Such contracts will contain both price 
and non-price provisions, such as a specified price adjustment mechanism over time and 
minimum quantity and coal attribute provisions.   Joskow (1988; 1990) finds that when the price 
of coal dipped after 1982, coal contracts were still largely adhered to, despite the downturn in 
prices.  This illustrates the resilience of these contract commitments.  He concludes that mine 
and plant owners generally prefer to abide by contractual obligations, than to terminate, breach, 
or litigate a contract.  When contracts are renegotiated, compromises are often made; prices fall 
but minimum quantity provisions at the same time increase.  
 The early literature on contract design was spearheaded by Coase (1937), Klein et al. 
(1978), and Williamson (1985).  These papers laid out the theory that it is the existence of 
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transaction costs which leads to vertical integration between exchange parties.  The degree of 
vertical integration can range from simple contracts, to complex mergers, all the way up to 
regulation and/or government takeover of the transacting environment (Goldberg 1976), but 
ultimately all forms of integration exist as a response to the hold-up problem.   
The hold-up problem occurs when one firm makes an investment whose value is largely 
determined through the use of another firm’s product and subsequently finds that the other firm 
tries to expropriate the rents generated by a relationship specific investment. Three important 
categories of transaction costs have been identified in the literature:  the uncertainty/complexity 
of the contracting environment, the time duration of the exchange relationship, and the degree of 
investment by either party in relationship-specific assets, be they physical assets, human capital 
assets, or assets of some other form. 1   
Predictions of transaction cost theory are that as uncertainty, duration of an exchange 
relationship, or degree of relationship-specific investments increase, vertical integration of some 
form should increase as well.  The problem with vertical integration as embodied in contracts, 
however, is that contracts can never be completely specified.  This inability to write complete 
contracts leads to other testable hypotheses of transaction cost theory, such as that as uncertainty 
or duration increase, contracts should become more relational or flexible in character, and that as 
investments increase, contracts should become less flexible, or, longer in duration.   
Over the years a number of empirical tests have been conducted which confirm these 
broad predictions of transaction cost theory.  Crocker and Masten (1988, 1991), Neumann and 
von Hirschhausen (2008) and Mulherin (1986) all investigated natural gas contract terms in the 
                                                            
1 Williamson (1999) later identified a fourth type of transaction cost, probity, but it is primarily related to 
governmental (not private-sector) contracts. 
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context of transaction cost theory and found, for example, that the longer the duration of the 
exchange relationship the more flexible the pricing arrangements, and that with higher degrees of 
asset specificity, contracts embody longer durations.  Other empirical confirmations of 
transaction cost theory include Crocker and Reynolds (1993), using U.S. Air Force engine 
procurement contracts, and Gil (2007), using movie industry contracts in Spain.   
 More recently, a theoretical literature has developed arguing that the inefficiencies 
inherent in the hold-up problem of long-term contract design can be eliminated through optimal 
contract provisions including, for example, renegotiation provisions (Aghion et al. 1994, Hart 
and Moore 1988) or options clauses (Rogerson 1992, Noldeke and Schmidt 1995).  It is an 
interesting discussion which, to date, sorely lacks empirical tests.  The only empirical model of 
the renegotiation decision in the literature can be found in Guasch et al. (2008), and it is a test of 
the determinants of renegotiation provisions, not so much whether or not they lead to optimality 
of contract design.  As such, however, it is a research effort similar in spirit to our own.  It is an 
empirical analysis of concession contracts in Latin America in the transport and water sectors 
and it finds that contract clauses do significantly matter to the renegotiation decision.  
Specifically, they find that more flexible pricing schemes lead to a lower probability of later 
renegotiation.  Overall, there is a need for more empirical testing of these ideas in the literature. 
 This analysis uses the 1990 CAAA as the policy shock which leads parties to consider 
contract renegotiation.2  Regulation of coal-fired power plants is critical to controlling emissions 
of sulfur dioxide (SO2), as approximately 66% of all emissions come from coal-fired power 
plants.  Sulfur dioxide is formed when the sulfur inherent in the coal combines with oxygen in 
                                                            
2 Empirical work by Keohane and Busse (2007)  and Lange and Bellas (2007) has already shown that initial rent 
distributions were affected by the 1990 CAAA. 
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the combustion process.  The concern at the time was over the acidification of water sources 
(acid rain) from the sulfur dioxide emissions.3  U.S. federal regulation of sulfur dioxide 
emissions from coal-fired boilers began with the 1970 Clean Air Act, under which a vintage 
differentiated emission standard was employed.  Existing boilers were regulated by the states 
while new boilers were federally regulated.  States generally had much more generous standards 
than the federal government, which led to increased use of existing boilers and as a result a 
slower reduction in sulfur dioxide emissions than policymakers had hoped for. 
During the 1980s various sulfur dioxide control bills appeared before Congress, but with 
little success.  The politics of the problem made it difficult for most potential policies to proceed 
(Ellerman et al, 2000).  It wasn’t until a new administration came to power in 1989 that the 
political landscape changed to make another attempt at sulfur dioxide legislation successful.  The 
1990 CAAA, through Title IV, initiated a system of tradable permits for SO2 emissions that 
would eventually apply to most coal-burning power plants in the U.S.  The permit system was 
implemented in two phases. Phase I began in 1995 with the inclusion of approximately 263 
boilers which were granted permits at a rate of 2.5 lbs of SO2 emitted per million Btu. Phase II 
began in 2000 and applied to essentially the entire population of coal-fired power plants in the 
U.S., which were granted permits at a rate of 1.2 lbs of SO2 emitted per million Btu.  All of the 
Phase I boilers affected had previously been unregulated, at least at the federal level, and 
generally burned high sulfur coal and emitted large amounts of SO2. 
By almost every measure, Title IV has been a success.  Carlson et al (2000) estimates a 
savings of around $250 million annually from Phase I and Ellerman et al (2000) estimates a $360 
                                                            
3 The acid rain debate (from sulfur emissions) is very similar to the current climate change debate (from carbon 
emissions). 
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million annual savings.  However, some studies suggest that there may be more savings 
available.  Swinton (2004), Carlson et al (2000) and Sotkiewicz and Holt (2005) use three 
different applied methods to determine that the potential cost savings of Title IV is larger than 
the actual cost savings.  All three papers speculate that the divergence between actual savings 
and potential savings could be due to the inability to alter long-term coal contracts.  This work 
can shed light on the speculation that coal contracts prohibited the tradable permit scheme from 
reaching its cost savings potential.  More broadly, this paper investigates the effect of the 1990 
CAAA policy shock on the decision to renegotiate long-term coal contracts. 
 
Theoretical Model 
We formulate our test of the renegotiation decision in long-term U.S. coal contracts 
around the following model.4  We begin with a buyer and a seller, both of which are risk neutral.  
They enter into a relationship at some initial date, (Period 0 in Figure X) through a written 
contract, to trade over a period of time a particular good, q.  The characteristics of q at delivery 
are not fully specified when the contract is signed in period 0.  Either due to technological 
constraints or environmental constraints, it is assumed that it is not possible to completely 
specify at date 0 the type of q to be delivered.  q is therefore dependent upon a number of 
characteristics, as represented by the vector l, including quality of the good and geographical 
location of the good, such that q(l). 
 
 
 
                                                            
4 Notation follows that used in Hart and Moore (1988) and Noldeke and Schmidt 
  Period 0  Period 1  Periods 2,…,N
 
Contract  Investments  State of the World Realized;   
  Signed    Made       Trade Decision Made 
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After the contract is signed, both the buyer and the seller make irreversible investments, 
(l) and (l) respectively, that allow them to carry out the contract.  Because the choices of  and 
  are dependent upon expectations of the characteristics l, it is apparent that  and   are 
sufficiently complex that they too cannot be contracted on in period 0.   and  are, however, 
determined early, in period 1, and so they entail a degree of commitment between the buyer and 
the seller that cannot be reversed in later periods if either party changes their mind about delivery 
of q.  After period 1, because of these committed investments whose resale value is assumed to 
be less than their value in their intended usages, the buyer and seller are now locked-in to each 
other.  This, in essence, models the hold-up problem inherent in long-term contract design. 
In the next period, after the contract is signed and production investments are made, the 
state of the world,, is realized.   is allowed to change in any period based on exogenous 
factors such as new demand preferences, weather effects, or, of most relevance to this paper, 
policy shocks.  The realization of  allows ultimate valuations over execution of the initial 
contract to be determined.  The buyer’s valuation is given by the random variable v, and the 
seller’s valuation by the random variable c, whose distributions are affected by l, and the 
ultimate state of the world such that  
  v = v[; (l); q(l)] 
  c = c[; (l); q(l)] 
where  , the set of all states of the world,  l  ; ,, and q are functions mapping  → Ψ, 
and v and c are functions mapping (;Ψ) → R.  We assume that there are no externalities, that  
is finite, and that  is publicly observable in each period 2,…,N though sufficiently unknowable 
that it cannot be contracted on in period 0.  We also assume that though the joint distribution of v 
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and c is common knowledge in period 0, the ultimate realization of v and c are not publicly 
observable. 
In periods 2,…,N if vc, it is efficient for the parties to execute the trade agreement (i.e. 
q>0).  Note that even if vc, due to the realization of , the sizes of v and c may themselves have 
changed and with them the original rent distribution from the trade agreement.  The model has 
moved away from whatever equilibrium it may have been in the previous period, and because of 
this, it is likely that one party to the contract is no longer happy with their share of the trade 
surplus, v-c.  Either the buyer or the seller in this instance, may, therefore, seek an (implicit or 
explicit) renegotiation of the contract.  We model the probability that explicit renegotiation 
occurs as , and we assume, based on transaction cost theory, that it is dependent on the 
flexibility of the characteristics of the delivered good, l, to make up for the changes in v and c 
that occur due to the new realization of . 
Our testable hypothesis, therefore, is that as policy shocks occur and  changes, the 
realization of  (from 0→1) is dependent upon (l), the distribution of the characteristics l.  
Formally:  A wider range of l, as measured by the distribution (l), implies →0, it is easier to 
implicitly renegotiate.  Alternatively, inflexible contract terms (i.e. a limited (l) range) implies 
→1, it is easier to explicitly renegotiate.  We test this hypothesis in the analysis below. 
  
Data 
Our empirical context is long term U.S. coal (q) contracts.  Data (l) on these contracts 
were obtained from the Coal Transportation Rate Database (CTRB) which is maintained by the 
Energy Information Administration. The CTRB is a survey of investor-owned, interstate electric 
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utilities with steam-electric generating stations of more than 50 megawatts.5  The dataset can be 
thought of as two separate data sources merged.  The first set of information is on the contracts 
and the second is information on deliveries for each contract.  The complete dataset contains 
information on coal transactions for the years 1979-1999, regardless of when the contract was 
signed. Information included are the type of contract, cost, quality, and origin of coal purchases 
as well as the lower and upper bounds for a number of coal attributes.   
The dataset codes each contract with a unique identification number.  Each contract 
appears many times in the dataset as deliveries occur over time.  With each delivery in the data, 
the year signed and year of last modification are given.  Modifications are evidence of explicit 
renegotiations in the contract (=1).  The number of renegotiations and percentage of contract 
renegotiated throughout the sample can be seen in Figure 1.  There are two spikes in the figure, 
one between 1988 and 1989 and another between 1992-1994.  These spikes straddle the passage 
of the CAAAs in 1990 suggesting that preparation for, and response to, this legislation may have 
been an impetus for large numbers of contract renegotiations.  The information in the CTRB is 
used to determine the vintage of each delivery, either the year signed if no modifications are 
specified, or the year of last modification.  Contracts signed in 1991 or later are excluded from 
the analysis. Contracts with a vintage of 1990 or earlier but expiration before 1994 are excluded 
from the analysis since they would not need to be renegotiated given they expire before the 1990 
CAAA are put into effect.  This leave contracts with a vintage of 1990 or earlier that were still in 
effect in 1995.  There are 273 contracts in the dataset that fit these restrictions.  If any of these 
contracts had a vintage change to 1991 or later, they were considered renegotiated (=1).  The 
                                                            
5 Our final empirical analysis includes data from 146 distinct electricity plants from approximately 80 utilities. 
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dependent variable for this analysis, Renegotiated Contracts, is binary and set to one if a contract 
is indeed renegotiated and zero (=0) otherwise. 
The explanatory variables (l) detail the parameters of the contract and the plant and mine 
involved.  Perhaps the most important variables included relating to our policy shock of passage 
of the 1990 CAAA () are Allowable Sulfur Upper Bound and Phase I Plant.  Allowable Sulfur 
Upper Bound is a measure of the contracted coal’s allowable sulfur content upper bound, in 
percent by weight.  After passage of the 1990 CAAA, higher sulfur-content coal was suddenly 
markedly less valuable than lower sulfur-content coal.  Contracts that allowed for delivery of 
higher sulfur-content coal, then, became less valuable to the plant owner, although at the same 
time more valuable to the mine owner.  It is difficult to predict a priori which direction the sign 
on this coefficient will go, as it will depend on the relative bargaining strength of the mine and 
plant owner, but according to transaction cost theory, greater contract flexibility should imply 
reduced contract renegotiation and since a higher sulfur upper bound implies a wider 
distributional range, we predict that in the aggregate, the coefficient on this variable should be 
negative.6 
Phase I Plant is a dummy variable that takes a one if any of the boilers at a plant are 
subject to Phase I of Title IV of the 1990 CAAA.  Plants that are affected by the regulatory shock 
of the 1990 CAAA are expected to be more likely to renegotiate their contracts.  To distinguish 
between the effect of the allowable sulfur content upper bound on plants with Phase I boilers, 
and plants without, an interaction term is created, Phase I*Allowable Sulfur, which is the product 
of the allowable sulfur content upper bound and the Phase I dummy.  It is expected that the 
                                                            
6 A specification where contracts with an allowable sulfur content upper bound above the rate of permits granted in 
Phase I (2.5 lbs of SO2 emitted per million Btu) is set to one and below set to zero was also run with the same results 
in sign and significance as Allowable Sulfur Upper Bound. 
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interaction term will be positive as Phase I plants with a high allowable sulfur content upper 
bound will have the contract rent distribution (v-c) most affected by Title IV.  
A number of variables are used to proxy for the level of transaction costs between the 
parties. The first relates to the physical distance between the parties.  Distance Apart measures 
the total distance in hundreds of miles that the coal travels from mine to plant, and is used to 
proxy for the closeness of the relationship of the contracting parties.  We hypothesize that 
contracting parties that are geographically closer may have developed a stronger trade 
relationship, making the contract more flexible, leading to less need to explicitly renegotiate 
(→0).   
Four variables are created to proxy for the level of dedicated assets (,) the contract 
implies for the plant and mine.7 Plant Dedicated Assets are defined as the ratio of an individual 
contract quantity to the sum of the plant's contract quantity.  Similarly, Mine Dedicated Assets is 
the ratio of an individual contract quantity to the sum of the mine's contract quantity.  Larger 
levels of dedicated assets imply more appropriable quasi-rent at stake in the transaction, which 
will lead to a less flexible contract (Saussier 2000).  Thus, larger levels of dedicated assets are 
expected to lead to increases in the probability of explicit renegotiation when faced with a policy 
shock.   A small percentage of plants are located at the “mine’s mouth.”  Minemouth plants, 
integrated as they are directly at the mining site, have less alternative suppliers than non-
minemouth plants, implying more dedicated assets between the parties.  A Minemouth dummy is 
created which equals one if the plant is located directly next to a mine.  Because of the relatively 
large amount of dedicated assets, these contracts should be inflexible and the probability that 
they are renegotiated due to external policy shocks, higher. Quantity is the minimum quantity to 
                                                            
7 This method follows Kerkvilet and Shogren (2001).   
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be delivered by the contract during each transaction.  Larger quantity contracts are associated 
with longer contracts, making them less flexible and more likely to be renegotiated. 
All contracts have a mechanism that adjusts prices over time.  The sample here contains 
four of them: fixed price, base price plus escalation for economic conditions, cost-plus, and price 
renegotiation at specific intervals.  Base price plus escalation contracts have an escalation that is 
usually a function of some economic indices (i.e., union wages or Consumer Price Index). Cost-
plus contracts promise to pay all suppliers’ costs plus a fee presumably determined before the 
contract goes into effect.  The first two mechanisms are more rigid than the last two, in that they 
pre-arrange how the price can adjust, instead of allowing flexibility into the adjustment.  A 
dummy variable, Rigid Price Adjustment, was created equal to one for contracts that are in the 
first category, fixed price or base price plus escalation.  A more rigid price adjustment 
mechanism makes it more difficult to implicitly negotiate the contract, thus it is expected that a 
more rigid price adjustment mechanism is associated positively with renegotiation (→1). 
The Relative Price of the coal is calculated using data from the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) Form 423 on coal supplied for the year 1990.   The mean and 
standard deviation of the price for each Bureau of Mine’s coal producing district is calcualted 
and the contract price in 1990 was used to calculate a z-score ((price–mean)/standard deviation).  
Bureau of Mine Districts were created to help classify coal types, thus the coal within each area 
is quite similar in quality.  A positive relative price implies the contract price is above the mean 
price in the District.  The effect that a relatively high or low price has on the probability of 
renegotiation () depends upon the relative bargaining powers of the two parties, thus the 
expected sign is ambiguous. 
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A Years Till Expiration variable is created by subtracting 1991 from the contract 
expiration year.  This variable relates to the varying lengths of contracts; contracts in our sample 
have an expiration year that ranges from 1995 to 2027.  We would expect that, according to 
transaction cost theory, longer contracts (i.e. those with a higher value for Years Till Expiration) 
would have a higher probability of renegotiation (→1), because the more years till expiration, 
the longer the parties are subject to the new rent distribution.   
Another set of explanatory variables groups the contracts either by their vintage or the 
year signed:  pre-1985, 1985-1987, and 1988-1990.  The vintage of the contract is calculated 
using either the year the contract was signed if it has not been renegotiated, or the year of the last 
renegotiation before 1991.  There are no expectations as to how the different years signed or 
vintages of a contract will be associated with the probability of renegotiation; these variables (as 
with the geographical dummies described below) are used to control for factors that may lead to 
renegotiation regardless of the policy shock. 
Finally, dummy variables are created for each of the three coal-producing regions: the 
Appalachian, Interior, and Western coal mine regions.  The Western coal region has on average 
the lowest sulfur contents, followed by the Appalachian region and the Interior region.  
However, it is difficult to predict a priori which direction the sign on these region coefficients 
will go, as it will depend on the relative bargaining strength of the mine and plant owner.  For 
example, plants with a contract with a Western region coal mine are likely to not want to 
renegotiate while the mine would want to renegotiate given the change in the value of sulfur after 
Title IV. Summary statistics for all of the variables are given in Table 1, and Table 2 lists the 
expected effects of our explanatory variables on the probability of contract renegotiation. 
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Empirical Model 
The theoretical model discussed above argues that π, the probability of explicit 
renegotiation, increases in the face of a policy shock when (l) is narrow.  Narrow ranges of (l) 
occur when the contracting parties have little flexibility inherent in the contract to implicitly 
renegotiate. We do not observe the actual probability of renegotiation, only whether the contract 
was actually renegotiated.  Thus we use an indicator variable, Ri, to proxy for π such that there 
exists a π* where any π equal to or above that leads to renegotiation and any below leads to the 
continuation of the contract.  We parameterize our theoretical model using a probit estimation of 
the following equation:   
1i i iR L             [1]  
where Ri is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the contract was renegotiated and zero 
if it was not, Li is a vector of variables relating to the coal contract characteristics, and εi is an 
error term.  To determine whether the sample should be pooled or split by regions, each 
explanatory variable was interacted with the region dummy variables, and a Chi Squared-test 
was undertaken to discover if the explanatory variables are statistically equal across the three 
regions.  The results (available by request) fail to reject the null that the interacted coefficients 
are jointly equal to zero. Thus the sample is pooled for the empirical model given in [1].    
Grouping the error terms by utility (i.e. the firms that owns the power plants) or using the 
Sandwich estimator of variance does not change the statistical significance of the results.  Two 
estimations are shown in Table 3.  The first uses the entire sample and the second restricts the 
sample to those contract signed before 1988, to ensure exogeneity of the policy shock. 
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Results 
Table 3 provides the results of the probit estimation with the marginal effects reported 
instead of the estimation coefficients.  Two regressions are presented, the first on the full sample, 
the second on a restricted sample without the contracts that were signed between 1988 and 1990.  
This was done to ensure the exogeneity of the policy shock of passage of the 1990 CAAA.  It 
may have been that by 1988, three years prior to passage of the amendments, the writing was on 
the wall and coal mines and generation companies could tell that high sulfur coal was soon to be 
regulated.  The results between the two regressions are indeed remarkably similar.  The only 
coefficient whose significance changes is on the Rigid Price Adjustment variable and its 
increasing significance only adds to the story of the importance of particular variables to the 
likelihood of renegotiation.   
These results are in contrast to our counterfactual policy environment test, presented in 
Table 4.  In this regression only contracts in existence before 1984, which continued past 1987, 
are used in the analysis. The dependent variable is now equal to one if the contract was 
renegotiated between 1984 and 1986, and zero otherwise.  The years 1984 to 1986 correspond to 
no changes in the regulation of sulfur dioxide and thus provide a counterfactual policy 
environment to test our model.  In the results presented in Table 4, only one variable has the 
same sign and significance as the policy shock analysis, the Allowable Sulfur Content Upper 
Bound, and three variables that were not statistically significant in the policy shock analysis 
suddenly are in the counterfactual analysis.8  The counterfactual policy environment results are 
                                                            
8 One of these is the variable Phase I Plant.  In 1987 there was no such thing as a Phase I plant (it came about from 
passage of the 1990 CAAA), however, as stated above Phase I plants were generally older and higher emitting 
plants than average.   
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quite different than the policy shock results, implying that the policy shock results are reasonably 
attributable to the 1990 CAAA.  
Back to Table 3, in both samples, the Allowable Sulfur Content Upper Bound variable is, 
as predicted, associated with a lower probability of contract renegotiation.  However, interaction 
of the Allowable Sulfur Content Upper Bound variable with plants that were part of Phase I led 
to a greater likelihood of contract renegotiation.  This implies that Phase I plants whose contracts 
specified a wide range of allowable sulfur content in the coal are more likely to renegotiate then 
those that did not.  This is an interesting result on the heterogeneous effects of the 1990 CAAA 
on plant types.9   
Some of the transaction costs variables drawn from the literature and discussed in the 
data section have the expected sign, and a few are statistically significant.  Larger Distance Apart 
and Quantity variables are statistically associated with a higher probability to renegotiate, as 
predicted by transaction cost theory.  These variables lead to more appropriable quasi-rents, 
which lead to less flexible contracts and the need to renegotiate when a policy shock occurs.  
Surprisingly, the dedicated asset variables are insignificant across the two samples.  One would 
assume that coal mines and generating plants both have large fixed costs and therefore 
substantial dedicated assets in their respective businesses, yet the coefficients on these variables 
are insignificant.  It could be that these proxies are not very good,10 or, it could be that the large 
fixed costs involved in coal mining and use – both industries with long histories – have by now 
and for the most part been recovered.  There is less that is “dedicated” and more that has already 
been paid off and sunk. 
                                                            
9 The exact same pattern is found when the discrete sulfur variable is used as compared to the continuous one.  
Results available from the author by request. 
10 Although other authors use similar measures such as Kerkvilet and Shogren (2001).   
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A more Rigid Price Adjustment mechanism is associated with a statistically larger 
probability to renegotiate only when the 1988-1990 contracts are excluded.  It has the correct 
sign in the full sample, but it is not statistically significant.  The Years Till Expiration variable is 
positive and significant across the regressions indicating an increased probability of 
renegotiation the longer the duration of the contract.  This is expected given that the parties 
would be subject to the new rent distribution for a longer period of time. 
Finally, the Western Coal Mine variable is negatively and statistically significant 
implying that contracts with Western coal mines were less likely to be renegotiated compared to 
those with Appalachian coal mines.  Given that the 1990 CAAA increased the value of the coal 
in the West, as it was low-sulfur, this result implies that the plants had more bargaining power 
than the mines.  At the same time, the Relative Price variable is also negative and statistically 
significant, implying that contracts with high relative prices were also less likely to be 
renegotiated.  This result favors the mine owner.  These two results together, on Western Coal 
Mine and Relative Price, may be indicating the kind of deal that was struck between plant and 
mine owners to avoid explicit renegotiation.  High quality, low-sulfur coal continued to be 
delivered, but only where the relative price was high. 
In order to further explore the possible validity of this kind of a pact, we decided to look 
for evidence of it also in the explicitly renegotiated contracts.  We did this by empirically 
exploring how the price of coal changed for those contracts that were renegotiated.  This is 
important as it also speaks to the ultimate rent re-distribution winners and losers from the policy 
shock.11 
                                                            
11 In current climate change legislation, schemes that involve a cap-and-trade proposal and emissions permits for 
electric utilities are sometimes seen as acting as a windfall to utility companies.  If, however, due to the legislation, 
the utility companies are  having to renegotiate their contracts for fossil fuel inputs, this windfall may actually be 
19 
 
A difference-in-difference hedonic price analysis was undertaken to determine how the 
price of coal changed after renegotiation.12 This was done first on all renegotiation delivery data, 
but it was also done on subsets of the data, including:  1) for plants that contain at least one 
Phase I boiler, 2) for plants that contain at least one Phase I boiler and the Western (low-sulfur) 
coal mines, and 3) for plants that contain at least one Phase I boiler and the Interior (high-sulfur) 
coal mines.   
 Results of the difference-in-difference hedonic price analysis are given in Table 5.  None 
of the estimations reveal a statistically significant difference-in-difference parameter estimate; 
however the signs do match expectations.  When looking at contracts with Western coal mines, 
the estimate is positive while the opposite is true for contracts with the Interior coal mines. This 
pattern follows from the expectations stated above and suggests that the outcome of any 
renegotiation, whether implicit or explicit, may be some sort of a low-sulfur/high price pact.  
Further research investigating the strategic bargaining behind these renegotiation deals would be 
enlightening. 
 
Conclusions  
New policy initiatives have the ability to substantially shift rents within an economy, 
especially with respect to long-term investments.  This paper investigates how long-term 
contracts for coal delivery in the electricity generation industry responded to passage of the 1990 
CAAA. The topic is contemporary as many countries are debating policies to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions and their resulting impact on the distribution of income.  The findings reveal little 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
falling to other players in the industry down the line.  Such an argument, in fact, is frequently made by the utility 
companies in support of the financial need for initial permit allocations to be free, rather than auctioned off. 
12 For more information about the hedonic price model, see Lange and Bellas (2007). 
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evidence that either party was “stuck” with the contract previously signed, as those we expect 
likely to want to renegotiate seem to be able to.  Further, many studies speculate that cost savings 
for Title IV could have been larger if long-term coal contracts were able to adjust to the new 
regulation.  We find that many contracts were flexible enough to be renegotiated so failure to 
achieve cost-savings potentials can not obviously be blamed on the contracting environment. 
The hypothesis tested here is that when an outside shock occurs in the midst of a 
contracting environment, the more flexible the initial terms of the contract, the lower the 
probability of contract renegotiation in response to the outside shock.  A model is devised which 
reveals that a contracts’ degree of flexibility affects the probability of renegotiation.  
Empirically, the degree of flexibility is measured with contract price adjustment mechanism, 
number of years until expiration, quantity contracted, and distance between the parties.  A probit 
model is estimated which finds an association between contracts with a more years till 
expiration, large quantity, larger total distance apart, and the probability of renegotiation. Plants 
that were part of Phase I and have a higher allowable sulfur content upper bound are statistically 
more likely to renegotiate their contract.  These results suggest that long-term coal contracts are 
not a major reason that Phase I has not achieved its full potential cost savings.  More thoughtful 
research should be done investigating why this earlier permit trading scheme was not as cost-
effective as it could have been, especially since similar permit trading schemes are actively being 
considered for use in carbon regulation today.  The contracts that are most likely to benefit from 
renegotiating, Phase I plants with high allowable sulfur content upper bound, are also the ones 
that are statistically more likely to be renegotiated. 
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Figure 1: Coal Contract Renegotiation over Time 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
# of Contract Renegotiated % of Contracts Renegotiated  
24 
 
 Table 1: Summary Statistics 
  Full Sample  Renegotiated 
Contracts 
Unchanged Contracts 
 N=273  N=99  N=174  
 Variable   Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
 Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
 Mean  Std. Dev. 
Renegotiated Contracts 0.36 0.48         
Duration 21.90 10.67      
Allowable Sulfur Upper 
Bound 
1.39 1.26 1.22 0.97 1.48 1.40 
Phase I Plant 0.24 0.43 0.29 0.45 0.20 0.40 
Distance Apart (100 Miles) 4.15 4.39 5.25 4.84 3.56 4.20 
Plant Dedicated Assets 0.37 0.34 0.35 0.30 0.38 0.36 
Mine Dedicated Assets 0.19 0.27 0.16 0.21 0.21 0.30 
Quantity (1000 tons)  1.15 1.30 1.41 1.47 1.00 1.20 
Minemouth Plant 0.05 0.21 0.02 0.15 0.06 0.24 
Rigid Price Adjustment 0.81 0.40 0.87 0.35 0.77 0.47 
Relative Price 0.29 1.53 0.17 1.43 0.36 1.57 
Years Till Expiration from 
1994 
7.03 5.92 8.04 6.50 6.45 5.50 
88-90 Yr Signed  0.14 0.35 0.16 0.37 0.12 0.34 
85-87 Year Signed 0.14 0.34 0.11 0.31 0.15 0.36 
Appalachian Coal Mine 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Interior Coal Mine 0.18 0.36 0.20 0.40 0.18 0.40 
Western Coal Mine 0.31 0.48 0.31 0.46 0.31 0.46 
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 Table 2: Expected Signs 
Dependent Variable: Renegotiated 1991-1994 or Not 
 Independent Variable  Expected Sign 
Allowable Sulfur Upper 
Bound 
      - 
Phase I Plant       + 
Phase I * Allowable Sulfur        + 
Distance Apart (100 Miles)       + 
Plant Dedicated Assets       + 
Mine Dedicated Assets       + 
Minemouth Plant       + 
Quantity (1000 tons)        + 
Rigid Price Adjustment       + 
Relative Price       ? 
Years Till Expiration       + 
88-90 Year Signed        ? 
85-87 Year Signed       ? 
Interior Coal Mine       ? 
Western Coal Mine       ? 
?= Ambiguous   
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 Table 3: Determinants of Contract Renegotiation 
Probit Estimation-Marginal Effects Full Sample 
  
Contracts Signed Pre-1988 
Dependent Variable: Renegotiated between 1991-1994 or Not   
Variable  Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error 
Allowable Sulfur Upper Bound -0.11*** 0.04 -0.11** 0.05 
Phase I Plant -0.07 0.13 0.06 0.16 
Phase I * Allowable Sulfur  0.12* 0.07 0.15* 0.08 
Distance Apart (100 Miles) 0.03*** 0.00 0.03*** 0.00 
Plant Dedicated Assets -0.12 0.12 -0.08 0.12 
Mine Dedicated Assets -0.15 0.15 -0.06 0.15 
Minemouth Plant -0.20 0.13 -0.23 0.13 
Quantity (1000 tons)  0.05** 0.02 0.05* 0.02 
Rigid Price Adjustment 0.11 0.08 0.19** 0.08 
Relative Price -0.03* 0.02 -0.03* 0.02 
Years Till Expiration from 1994 0.01** 0.00 0.02** 0.00 
88-90 Year Signed  -0.02 0.08     
85-87 Year Signed -0.06 0.09 -0.06 0.09 
Interior Coal Mine 0.09 0.1 0.07 0.1 
Western Coal Mine -0.25** 0.08 -0.25** 0.08 
N 273  229  
R-Squared 0.16   0.21   
*, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% statistical significance    
 
27 
 
Table 4: Counterfactual Policy Shock Test 
Probit Estimation-Marginal Effects Full Sample   
Dependent Variable: Renegotiated between 1984-1986 or Not 
Variable  Estimate Std. Error 
Allowable Sulfur Upper Bound -0.06** 0.03 
Phase I Plant 0.33*** 0.06 
Distance Apart (100 Miles) 0.00 0.00
Plant Dedicated Assets -0.43*** 0.13 
Mine Dedicated Assets 0.20* 0.11 
Minemouth Plant -0.10 0.14 
Rigid Price Adjustment -0.04 0.07
Quantity (1000 tons)  0.03 0.03 
Relative Price -0.01 0.02 
Years Till Expiration from 1986 0.01 0.01 
83-84 Year Signed  0.12 0.11 
Interior Coal Mine 0.01 0.09 
Western Coal Mine -0.10 0.10 
N 281  
R-Squared 0.12   
*, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% statistical significance  
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Table 5: Renegotiation Effect on Price 
Dependent Variable: Real Price of Coal   
Estimation: Hedonic Price Difference-in Difference 
Model 
Difference-in-Difference 
Parameter 
Sample Estimate Std. Error 
All Plants (N=3409) -1.32 1.31 
All Phase I Plants (N=2992) -1.77 1.17 
Phase I Plants with Western Mine Contracts (N=348) 3.38 1.99 
Phase I Plants with Interior Mine Contracts (N=813) -2.03 1.28 
Other Explanatory Variables: Btu, Sulfur, Ash, & Moisture Content; Total Distance; 
Contract, Year &  Mine District Dummies 
Errors Clustered by Utility   
 
